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CHAPTER TWO 
A FRESH RIFF ON J. DENNY 
WEAVER'S A-THEOLOGY 
OR PROLEGOMENON TO A 
STEWARDSHIP RHETORIC 
Susan L. Biesecker and Jason R. Moyer 
Many people tell [him that his] style is [horrific]; it is kind of different, but 
let's get specific.1 
-KRSOne 
INTRODUCTION 
J. Denny Weaver's "theology" is irritating. Its style is impolite, its 
substance improper. Weaver writes, albeit in postmodern fashion, as 
one who speaks the truth. Although he recognizes that his truth is 
particular to an Anabaptist perspective, he also notes that every other 
truth-claim is similarly particular. However, while refusing to adopt 
common responses to this condition-polite tolerance, on the one 
hand, or self-righteous fundamentalism, on the other-Weaver nev-
ertheless confesses that his truth has universal aspirations.2 
Further, Weaver does not present his truth in an objective manner. 
Rather, his style is that of the advocate of a truth that carries definite 
29 
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implications not only for our collective politics but also for our indi-
vidual salvation. Weaver's style is impolite also in the sense that it is 
not deferential to theological authority, whether that authority de-
rives from tradition and takes the form of orthodoxy or grows out of 
privileged institutional positions and follows methodological prot~­
col. He does not assume that well-recognized and respected theologI-
cal approaches have any special claim on truth. On the contrary, he 
views such approaches with skepticism, assuming that their re-
spectability has more to do with privilege than insight. Weaver also 
does not seek our approval; instead, he demands our assent. Rather 
than rationalize our present beliefs or practices, he challenges us with 
the truth, demands that we agree, and calls us to be transformed. 
Finally, Weaver's style is relentlessly argumentative. He wel-
comes others' rebuttals as opportunities to sharpen his case, confi-
dent that ultimately he can win any argument. Moreover, he never 
tires of making his case and will make it anytime, anywhere, to any-
one. In all these ways Weaver's theological style is presumptuous, ir-
reverent, and contentious-in short, impolite. 
The substance of Weaver's theology is improper when measured 
against the standards of traditional theology. Weaver's theology does 
not take up in systematic fashion the traditional categories of theol-
ogy like Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, pneumatology, etc., to 
theorize them in relation to each other for a comprehensive under-
standing. Instead, his theology speaks to traditional theological cate-
gories as a response to perceived crises within the church. For in-
stance, Weaver takes up the atonement not to develop some larger 
theological system but to respond to a problem that he sees- namely, 
that the church's understanding of the atonement authorizes vio-
le~ce. I~ this sense Weaver's theology is deeply historical rather than 
pnmanly philosophical. 
Additionally, to resolve the problems he identifies, Weaver does 
not turn to classical theological systems from which he might con-
struct an alternative. Instead, he turns to Anabaptist sources, not as 
"heroes to emulate or principles to adopt," but as historical examples 
whose "struggle for faithfulness" yields a truthful interpretive lens 
for understanding Jesus and his relationship to the world.3 Through 
this interpretive lens we can read the true story of Jesus which, if we 
will choose to enter it, provides a genuine Christian posture from 
which we may engage the world. 
Not only are the sources for Weaver's theology atypical in the 
sense that they are historical rather than philosophical, they are also 
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sources once (and by some still) considered heretical: Anabaptists 
who did not produce their own "proper" theology; who had no w1i-
fied theological, sociological, or political origin; who had no rep-
utable spokesperson (like a Luther, Calvin, or Zwingli); who were 
itinerants jotting down apocalyptic musings while on the run from 
the authorities; and who even today resist easy categorization-nei-
ther Catholic nor Protestant, neither evangelical nor fundamentalist. 
Non-systematic, deeply historical, and based in "heretical" sources, 
we could say that more than a theology, Weaver's is an a-theology.4 
Weaver's a-theology not only breaks with the conventions and 
protocols of traditional theology, it also upends the purpose and dis-
rupts the substance of proper theology. Weaver challenges the pri-
mary purpose of traditional theology, to reveal the true nature of God, 
by insisting that theology is always political. For Weaver theology is 
never purely theoretical; it is also always a practice. That is, Weaver is 
always interested in what theology does by way of what it says. 
In Keeping Salvation Ethical, for instance, Weaver shows that the 
politics of theology, in this case nineteenth-century MeIU10nite atone-
ment theology, justified violence. Thus, he argues that "nineteenth-
cen t ury Mennonite a tonemen t theofog1J con tained a fa ten t threa t to the peace 
theology and to the peace practice of succeeding Mennonite generations 
(italics in original). "5 In his later study, The Nonviolent Atonement, 
Weaver continues to develop a corrective to those nineteenth-century 
theologies that authorized violence. His answer is what he calls nar-
rative Christus Victor atonement theology, a theology which, he ar-
gues, is inherently nonviolent and, therefore, incapable of authoriz-
ing violence: 
Above all, in narrative Christus Victor salvation and justice are 
no longer based on the violence of justice equated with punish-
ment. Salvation does not depend on balancing sin by retributive 
violence. Making right no longer means the violence of punish-
ment. Justice and salvation are accomplished in narrative Chris-
tus Victor by doing justice and participating in God's saving 
work.6 
So important are the politics of theology for Weaver that his start-
ing point for producing theology is by definition political. Specifi-
cally, rather than begin with the nature of God as would a traditional 
theology, Weaver's theology begins with Jesus and, moreover, not 
just any Jesus. Weaver's theology finds its logical origin in the nonvi-
olent Jesus of John Howard Yoder's The Politics of Jesus. Thus, for in-
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stance, Weaver's theology of atonement takes as its foundational 
premise the nonviolent politics of Jesus: 
The working assumption in development of this model [of nar-
rative Christus Victor] is that the rejection of violence, whether 
the direct violence of the sword or the systemic violence of 
racism or sexism, should be visible in expressions of Christology 
and atonement? 
With a nonviolent political Jesus at its center, Weaver's "theol-
ogy" disrupts the substance of proper theology by disturbing the nor-
mative status of the so-called ecumenical creeds. Traditionally the 
creeds are understood as a collection of uncontestable truths that 
serve as the foundation of Christendom. For Weaver the creeds are 
true yet problematic because they do nothing to shape the church in 
the direction of Jesus' teachings on the rejection of violence. Because 
they are silent on the teachings of Jesus, he argues, they do not do the 
political work that is needed-namely, to help the church witness to 
the nonviolent reign of God. So troubling is this argument for proper 
theology that it is worth quoting at length: 
Recall that Nicea's central claim is that Jesus is "one substance" 
or "one being" with the Father. Recall that the formula of Chal-
cedon proclaimed Jesus as "fully God and fully man." With 
awareness of the nonviolent character of the reign of God made 
visible in the narrative of Jesus and expressed in narrative Chris-
tus Victor, I simply ask, "What is there about the formulas of 
Nicea and Chalcedon that express the character of the reign of 
God, in particular its nonviolent character?" "What is there 
about these formulas that can shape the church that would fol-
low Jesus in witnessing to the reign of God in the world?" An-
swer: virtually nothing. If all we know of Jesus is that he is "one 
substance with the Father," and that he is "fully God and fully 
man," there is nothing there that expresses the ethical dimension 
of being Christ-related, nothing there that would shape the 
church so that it can be a witness to the world. When these for-
mulas serve as the summary touchstone of Christian faith, there 
is nothing of the particularity of Jesus to enable the Christ-re-
lated person to shape the church as an extension of Jesus' pres-
ence in the world.s 
As texts that, according to Weaver, fail to recognize the centrality 
of the rejection of violence not only to Jesus but to the reign of God, the 
creeds should not be taken as they have been for so long as defining 
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statements about what it means to be a Christian, even if the content 
of their specific propositions is accurate. 
Challenging the creeds in this way renders them inadequate for 
current ecumenical efforts which presume that a condition of possi-
bility for catholicity is an affirmation of the creeds as the uni versal 
and common core for all Christian theology, belief, and practice. Mark 
Noll observes that one of the great rifts within the Christian faith-
that is, between Catholics and evangelicals-has largely been sutured 
by the growing recognition among these two groups that they share 
in common core beliefs articulated by the creeds. Thus Noll writes: 
Among evangelicals and Catholics who are open to cooperation 
there now exists a broad and deep foundation of agreement on 
the central teachings of Christianity. Such evangelicals and 
Catholics affirm together the Trinity, the sinfulness of humanity, 
the saving love of God extended to sinners in the person and 
work of Jesus Christ, the redeeming power of the Holy Spirit to 
change men and women into servants of God, and the whole-
some integrity of God's law .. . . Differences on basic Christian 
convictions between Catholics and evangelicals fade away as if 
to nothing when compared to secular affirmations about the na-
ture of humanity and the world.9 
If the church's catholicity depends on core documents like the 
apostles' Creed or the evangelical "four spiritual laws" that omit the 
central truth of Jesus-the rejection of the sword-then the project of 
ecumenism excludes the most important feature of Christian faith . 
Thus, Weaver's tl1eology disturbs the ecumenical project by suggest-
ing that the unity it buys comes at the price of marginalizing the es-
sential truth of Christianity-God's rejection of violence. 
From the perspective of style, Weaver's theology is impolite. 
From the perspective of form, it is improper. From the perspective of 
substance, it is political. From the perspective of ecumenical efforts, it 
is troublemaking. Indeed, in all these ways it is irritating. 
TRUTH TELLING 
I came to you in weakness with great fear and trembling. My message and 
my preaching were not with wise and persuasive words, but with a 
demonstration of the Spirit's power, so that your faith might not rest on 
human wisdom, but on God's power. 
-Paul of Tarsus (1 Cor. 2:3-5, NIV) 
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To better contextualize the character of Weaver's irritating, im-
proper theology, we turn to the work of the French philosopher, 
Michel Foucault. Throughout his writings, Foucault seeks to describe 
the ways the particular discourses of psychiatry, punishment, sexual-
ity, and even grammar discipline our subjectivity by enabling us to 
speak, but only according to the modes authorized by these dis-
courses. In his study, Fearless Speech, Foucault takes up a question 
raised in the third volume of his History of Sexuality: How is it that, 
even as individual subjectivities are constituted and spoken by par-
ticular discourses, we might (and in fact do) nevertheless say some-
thing else, speaking in ways that are disruptive of available modes of 
making sense. To pursue this question, Foucault, as is his wont, turns 
to the ancient Greeks, seeking in them an idea or a practice foreign. to 
us. What he finds is the practice of parrhesia, or truth telling, a pr~chc.e 
that disturbs our still-modern understanding of truth by makmg It 
possible for us to imagine speaking truth to power even without se-
cure epistemological foundations. 
According to Foucault, the ancient Greek practice of parrhesia or 
truth telling speaks truth not by way of a correspondence betwe~n, 
say, word and reality but, instead, through a set of relationships 
among self, power, and morality that constitute the parrhesiastes, ~r 
truth teller. For Foucault, what this ancient Greek practice gives us IS 
a way to tell truth that transgresses our problems with a modern un-
derstanding of truth by constituting a certain ethos or position within 
language. and culture that enables truth telling. lO As we will see 
below, thIS demanding ethos requires that the truth teller occupy a 
particular position within language and culture characterized by 
frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. 
By frankness Foucault means a correspondence between thought 
and word. The truth-teller is someone "who says everything that 
[she] has in mind: [she] does not hide anything, but opens [her] heart 
and mind completely to other people through [her] discourse."u 
The parrhesiastes practices frankness because she understands her-
self to speak the truth. By truth Foucault means a correspondence be-
tween what is believed and what is true. For Foucault, the truth-
teller is someone who "says what is true because [she] knows it is 
true; and [she] knows that it is true because it really is true."12 How-
ever, the guarantor of the truth-teller's access to truth is not a mod-
ern epistemology but, instead, her moral quality. Moreover, the sign 
of the truth-teller's high moral quality is her courage: "If there is a 
kind of 'proof' of the sincerity of the parrhesiastes, it is [her] courage. 
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The fact that a speaker says something dangerous- different from 
what the majority believes- is a strong indication that [she] is a par-
rhesiastes. " 
By danger, Foucault signals that parrhesia always involves taking 
a risk. For Foucault, a parrhesiastes is one who in speaking the truth 
takes a risk because she speaks that truth to power. That risk mayor 
may not be life-threatening. It might involve anything from the loss of 
popularity, to the loss of a friendship, to the loss of life. In any case, the 
parrhesiastes is one who makes herself vulnerable by telling someone 
in power a truth they do not want to hear. Moreover, she does so be-
cause she would rather suffer on behalf of truth than gain security 
through falsehood . As Foucault puts it, the truth-teller takes this risk 
~ec~use "When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own 
life IS exposed, you are taking up a specific relationship to yourself: 
you risk death to tell the truth instead of reposing in the security of a 
life where the truth goes unspoken."l3 
. What makes the truth that the parrhesiastes tells potentially ob-
Jectionable to the other in power and, therefore, risky is its critical 
character. When the parrhesiastes confesses a truth critical of herself, 
she risks punishment from the other in power. When the parrhesi-
astes tells a truth critical of the other in power, she risks the wrath of 
t~e other. Such risk is an integral part of truth telling for Foucault 
S111ce the truth-teller is always in a subordinate relationship to the 
other: "[p]arrhesia is a form of criticism, either toward another or to-
~~rd oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor 
IS 111 a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor. The par-
rhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom [she] 
speaks. The parrhesia comes from 'below,' as it were, and is directed 
toward 'above.'''14 
The parrhesiastes takes the risk of speaking a critical truth to 
power because she knows it to be her duty to correct an error that she 
Or the other has made. However, in order for her to exercise her duty, 
she must choose it. For Foucault, parrhesia can never be coerced by 
another even as it is it undertaken out of an intense feeling of obliga-
tio~:. "To criticize a friend or a sovereign is an act of parrhesia ins~far 
as ~t IS a duty to help a friend who does not recognize his wrongdo~1g, 
or 111sofar as it is a duty toward the city to help the king to better hlm-
self as a sovereign. Parri1esia is thus related to freedom and to duty."15 
Parrhesia, in summary, is: 
a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation 
to truth through franknes ,a certain relati nship to his own life 
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through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other peo-
ple through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), 
and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. 
More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker 
expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life be-
cause he recognizes truth telling as a duty to improve or help 
other people (as well as [herself]).16 
Initially we might be surprised to find Foucault, a postmodern 
philosopher of great renown, advancing a characterization of truth 
telling. As conventionally understood, postmodern philosophy poses 
a profound challenge to truth or at least to modern conceptions of a 
stable, coherent, and universal truth. Yet this text describes an ethos 
conducive to truth telling. However, truth telling for Foucault does 
not involve establishing an epistemological link between language 
and reality, but rather cultivating a mode of being within discourse 
that makes possible a move beyond conventional wisdom toward the 
articulation of something else, something new, something true. The 
conditions of possibility for that ethos are frankness, truth, danger, 
criticism, and duty. 
WEAVER'S A-THEOLOGY AS TRUTH TELLING 
If Anabaptists, Catholics, and Protestants shared as much in common as 
[Arnold] Snyder's approach, it would then follow that neither side under-
stood the issue at stake (pun intended!).17 
-J. Denny Weaver 
With Foucault's retrieval of the ancient Greek practice of parrhesia 
in mind, v:e may read Weaver's a-theology as parrhesia and Weaver as 
a parrheslastes. Indeed, the features of parrhesia make for an apt char-
acterization of the style and substance of Weaver's a-theology. 
Earlier when we were arguing that Weaver's style is impolite, we 
defended that claim by pointing out that it is relentlessly argumenta-
tive. Also in that connection we noted that he actively seeks out op-
portunities to argue his a-theological positions. Now we may say that 
Weaver's style or, better put, his a-theological ethos, exhibits frank-
ness. Like the parrhesiastes, Weaver displays a correspondence be-
tween his thought and speech. It is as if he is incapable of holding 
back his arguments. Weaver exhibits the quality of frankness because 
he knows that he speaks the truth. There is nothing in Weaver's style 
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to indicate that he hesitates about the truth he espouses. The only 
question for him is how to present that truth in the most logically 
compelling way possible. 
When we earlier argued that the substance of Weaver's a-theol-
ogy is improper, we said that it did not meet traditional standards of 
t~~ology because it is neither systematic nor ahistorical, neither apo-
lIhcal nor creedal. Instead, we said that Weaver's a-theology is always 
shaped by contemporary exigencies within the church. Weaver does 
not focus on developing a coherent theological system that will stand 
the test of time but, instead, on faithfully continuing that historical 
struggle to make the church into the visible instantiation of God's 
reign within the contingencies of the present. Given Weaver's Ana-
baptist understanding that the church makes the reign of God visible 
when it presents itself as an alternative community faithful to the 
nonviolent politics of Jesus, Weaver's a-theology is thoroughly politi-
cal. Finally, we noted that Weaver's a-theology disrupts the status of 
the creeds by Simultaneously drawing our attention to the fact that 
the c~eeds say nothing on behalf of nonviolence and insisting that 
nonvlOlence be at the center of all things theological. For all these ~ea­
sons, then, we called Weaver's an a-theology-that is to say, an 1m-
proper theology. 
As such, Weaver's a-theology is dangerous. It is dangerous.for 
Weaver as a theologian because it breaks the rules of the theolog1cal 
~uild. In advanCing his a-theology, then, Weaver risks marginaliza-
hOn?r worse among proper theologians. Further, Weaver's a-theol-
ogy 1S dangerous in the sense that it speaks truth to power. He tells 
theologicu.1s something that they do not want to hear-namely, th~t all 
theology 1S political and, further, that theirs does not have the nght 
politics. In addition, as someone who bases his improper theology on 
the thinking of heretics and, in addition, locates himself in a con~em­
porary religious tradition often taken to be sectarian, Weaver fll1ds 
himself in an inferior position with respect to other theologians. ~s 
so~eone who challenges the theological guild from what that gUlld 
~en~es as a 'sectarian' position, it can be said that Weaver ~dopts an 
mfenor position through his a-theology and, thus, may nghtly be 
called critical in the sense Foucault means in his discussion of parrhe-
siastes . 
. A~ the crux of Weaver's a-theology is the necessary .choice that all 
Chnshans must make at the foot of the crosS and in the lIght of the res-
urrection between living according to the reign of God or ac~epting 
the rule of the not-yet-reign-of-God. For Weaver the atonement 1S not a 
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matter of the sacrifice of divine flesh for human sin which, accord~g 
to Anselmian substitutionary atonement, grants us God's .grace~:e 
Weaver's a-theology the Christ event represents the inbreakm~ o~ 
reign of God which creates an aporia or impasse that all Chnshha.ns 
. . S 1 . b liges a c 01ce 
must resolve by w ay of the1r own chOIce. a vat~on 0 for sal-
about faith in Jesus' victory over the powers. Wh1le necessar~ h ice 
vation, however, this choice is insufficient. Having made this c °th 
the Christian must then live accordingly. She must ';itne.ss to be 
truth in which she has faith- that the reign of God is vlctonous- .y 
living according to its logic rather than according to the logics of s~ 
and death. Thus, all that she thinks, says, and does should correspon 
to that reign-of-God logic. ly 
k h · . 1 h 'ch he sure If Weaver ta es 1S own a-theology sen ous y, w 1 t 11 
does, then he is obliged to tell others the truth that he knows, ~o e
t them that their salvation depends not only on recognizing the ultuna e 
supremacy of the reign of God but also having done so, to w itness to 
. . ' h . cehe that chOlce m all that they do. He is obliged to tell this trut s111 
has himself made this choice. Thus, everything he thinkS, says 1'. or 
d . I d ' 1 . 1 Truth tel 1l1g oes, mc u mg :us a-t 1.eology, must serve as h is witness. the 
is a matter of his own salvation . It is also a matter of his duty to k 
other. Knowing as he does that the fate of the other's soul is at sta e, 
Weaver is obliged to tell the other what she does not w ant to hear-
namely, that discipleship and the conduct of life is a matter of salva-
tion. Or, put another way, faith, although necessary, is insufficient. 
Recalling what Foucault says about the relationship betwee~ 
freedom and obligation, we may say both that Weaver's a-theology ~ 
t t . h ' h . tes It 1S a onemen 1S parr eS1astic and that Weaver is a parr eS1as . 
parrhesiastic, first, because it depends upon the Christian's freedo~ 
to choose whether to tell the other the truth. The Christian has the op 
tion to wit~ess to the ~eig~ of God or not. It is parrhesiasti~, seco;~~ 
because th1S truth tellmg mvolves confronting the other WIth so 
thing she does not want to hear. Finally Weaver is a parrhesiasteS 
since he freely chooses to tell this discomforting truth to the other f~r 
h b f' t I . b ;'" thlS er ene ~ . t 1S?n ehalf of her salvation that he freely engages u' 
a-theologIcal wItness to the reign of God. 
We o~e.ne.d t~is paper with the claim that J. Denny Weaver'~ a-
theology 1S untatmg because its style is impolite and its substance Irn-
proper. We supported our claim by showing how Weaver's style an~ 
substance may easily be read in that way. With a turn to FoucaulttS 
d · f h ' h "fres 1. rea mg 0 parr eS1a, owever, we have a ttempted to w rite a 
riff, " or a new take on that easy read. Thus, we have argued that 
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Weaver's a-theology should not be read as simply irritating but, in-
stead, should be unders tood as parrhesiastic because it frankly criti-
cizes power out of a sense of duty even in the face of danger. Having 
said this much we also want to say that neither Weaver's parrhesiastic 
a-theology nor his e thos as a parrhesiastes are unique to him. On the 
contra ry, the cha rac te ris ti s we have id ntified in Weaver 's a-theol-
ogy may also be read amid many sixte nth-century Anabaptist tex ts. 
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY 
ANABAPTISM AS TRUTH TELLING 
Two Dominican friars also ca llie to her, tile one os a confessor, and the 
other os all ill stl'1lctor. The lotter showed her tile crll cijix, sayillg: "See, 
here is your Lord and your God.' She answered: 'This is not my God; the 
cross by which J have been redeemed, is a different one. This is a wooden 
god; throw iIilll into tl1e fire, and warJII yourselves witllilim. ,,18 
- Martyrs Mirror 
Qlles. " What do YOll lIold concernillg the lIoly oil?" 
Ans. "Oil is good for salad, or to oil your shoes with . ,, 19 
-Martyrs Mirror 
The origins of Anabaptist truth t lling may be found among the 
stories recounted in Martyrs Mirror. In those stories we hear of Ana-
ba~tists who willingly and frequently defied church-state authorities 
by lI1structing those authorities in what they knew to be the truth of 
the Christian faith. For this truth telling, thousands were executed by 
the authorities and many more were severely tortured or exiled. One 
such story goes like this: 
About the year 1553 ... a shopkeeper, named Simon, . . . stOOd. in 
the marketplace, to sell his wares. When the priests passed him 
with their idol, this Simon did not dare give divine honor to this 
idol made by human hands, but, according to the tes timony of 
God presented in the holy Scriptures, would worship and serve 
only the Lord his God. He was therefore apprehended by the 
maintainers of the Roman antichrist, and examined in the faith, 
which he freely confessed, rejecting their self-invented infant 
baptism together with all human commandments, and holding 
fas t only to the tes timony of the Word of God; hence he was sen-
tenc d to d ath by the nemies of the trLIth, and was thus led 
without the city, and burnt for the testimony of Jesus.20 
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In his defiant stance on the street that day, Simon frankly spoke 
the truth about idols by refusing to perform an act of subservience. t~ 
them. He further instructed the authorities in that truth, thereby cr~t~­
cizing them, by not bowing down to them. His was an esp~cially VISI-
ble critique that, according to the account and the engravmg that ac-
companies it, was known to him, to the authorities, and to all assem-
bled on the street that day and could not go unanswered. Answered it 
was, of course, by his prompt execution. 
Speaking of the hundreds of Anabaptist martyr stories he had 
compiled for The Martyrs Mirror, Thieleman van Braght writes the fol-
lowing about the freedom and even boldness with which these truth 
tellers went forth to their executions for their frankness and truth: 
Yet to look upon all this [death and torture] will not cause real 
sadness, for though the aspect is dismal according to the body, 
the soul will nevertheless rejoice in it, seeing that not one of all 
those who were slain preferred life to death, since life often was 
proffered them on condition that they depart from the constancy 
of their faith. But this they did not desire; on the contrary, many of 
them went boldly onward to meet death; some even hastened to 
outstrip others, that they might be the first, who did not shrink 
from suffering anything the tyrants could devise, nay more than 
could be thought possible for a mortal man to end ure. 21 
Simon's story was not unique, Braght tells us. Despite diff~renc~s 
in the details among the stories recounted in Martyrs Mirror, Slffion s 
story is paradigmatic of the rest, at least in terms of truth telling. As 
we said above, then, Weaver's particular parrhesia and his ethos as a 
parrhesiastes can be understood as a reiteration of the thousands of 
sixteenth-century Anabaptist parrhesiastes who preceded him. .. 
Reading Weaver through Foucault allows us to recognize that It IS 
not the case that Weaver has a theology that just happens to be argued 
~.an irritating .way. Weaver's theology is irritating precisely beca.u~e 
It IS a truth tellmg. And truth telling is always irritating because It IS 
always antagonistic, which in this case is to say that it is contrary to 
the interests of the ~~wers. Fin~lly, this reading via Foucault h~s en-
abled us to say that It IS antagonIstic in this way for reasons of faIth. 
THE GIFT OF TRUTH 
What God-word brings, may we embrace; Success and suff'ring greet us; 
confronting evil face to face, as scorn and anger meet us. For freedom's 
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sake we bend we break, a sign to ev'ry nation that we have found a solid 
ground; God's Word our sure foundation. 22 
-Ausbund Hymn 
In Fearless Speech Foucault draws attention to the fact that for an-
cient Greeks, unlike moderns, the acquisition of truth was not a prob-
lem. For moderns who, since Descartes, are modern insofar as they 
are suspicious of truth, the method by which truth is obtained is the 
central problem. In modern epistemology truth is secured through 
the proper and orderly application of reason, logic, and evidence, By 
contrast, for ancient Greeks who were not suspicious of truth, their 
concern was not with method but with the moral character of the one 
speaking truth. As Foucault puts it: 
[sJince Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is ob-
tained in a certain (mental) evidential experience. For the 
Greeks, however, the coincidence between belief and truth does 
not take place in a (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity, 
namely, parrhesia.23 
As we noted in our earlier discussion of truth as a dimension of 
parrhesia, the activity of truth telling depends on the moral character 
of the truth teller rather than on proper method. To quote Foucault 
again: "In the Greek conception of parrhesia ... there does not seem to 
be ayroblem about the acquisition of the truth since such truth-hav-
mg IS guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities: when 
someone has certain moral qualities, then that is the proof that he has 
access to truth-and vice versa."24 Thus, the condition of possibility 
for parrhesia is an ethos understood not in the generiC sense of credi-
b'li b . 25 I ty ut m the more particular sense of moral character. 
. Earlier we noted that in recovering the activity of parrhesia (as it 
mclud~s frankness, truth, danger, criticism, an~ duty), Fou~a~lt 
ma~es It possible for us to imagine a subject posItion f.rom wlthm 
Whl~~ contemporary modes of making sense may be dI~r~pt~d. In 
addItion we indicated that imagining such a subject posItion IS el: -
abled by the fact that parrhesia circumvents the modern problematic 
of truth. 
Now.we see how this is so. By recuperating a decidedly premod-
ern practIce of truth, Foucault shifts the question from one of truth to 
tru~h telling, from one of knowledge to ethos, from one of method to 
ethIcs. In so doing he makes it possible for us postmoderns, who are 
no more capable of confidence in the modern regime of truth than we 
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are able simply to give up its methods for securing truth, to imagine a 
way to speak truth to power. 
For sixteenth-century Anabaptists, the acquisition o~ tru~ was 
also not the problem. Like the ancient Greeks, the Anabaptists dId n~~ 
doubt the truth that they knew. Further, as we argued above, they t~ . 
that truth as parrhesiastes- that is as truth tellers who frankly crz~ 
cized the powers in the face of danger and out of a sense?f duty. k 
though they shared the practice of parrhesia with the anCIent Gr~eb s 
and in this sense occupied a similar ethos, their ethos was shape. I 
its relationship to a peculiar truth that was not derived but awaIte , 
not fixed but messianic, not discovered but given. 
Unlike modern truth, derived from the rigors of logical dedu~­
tion, empirical verification, and objective scrutiny, Anabaptist truth IS 
collectively awaited. Following the Rule of Paul, sixteenth-cent~ry 
Anabaptists sought truth in the congregation gathered around Scnp-
ture and awaiting the Holy Spirit. According to John Howard Yoder, 
"[ilt is a basic novelty in the discussion of hermeneutics to say that a 
text is best understood in a congregation. This meanS that the tools of 
literary analysis do not suffice; that the Spirit is an interpreter of what 
a text is about only when Christians are gathered in readiness to hear 
it speak to their current needs and concerns."26 Further, Yoder argues, 
this mode of truth-seeking implies that every member of the congre-
gation has the potential to speak truthP In other words, every mem-
ber of the congregation has the potential to speak as a parrhiastes. 
Furthermore, the congregation is not bound either by creedal st~te­
ments or tradition as it seeks the truth. In such a context for seekmg 
truth, there is no historical a priori ground by which truth may be se-
cured.28 T~e Holy Spirit is in charge of those gathered and leads the 
congregatlon toward what may likely be an altogether new under-
standing of the text and thus of truth. 
An additional implication of this mode of seeking truth is th~t 
truth is not fixed or static but arrives by way of the Holy Spirit and IS 
on the move. It does not keep repeating itself but often makes unex-
pected claims. This seems to be the point that sixteenth-century Ana-
baptist Pilgram Marpeck makes When he writes about the nature of 
the truth of the cross: "The living cross and hand of Christ shows the 
w~y, do~s. n?t stand immovable in one place, never has and never 
WIll, for It IS Itself the way from which the truth comes and is the truth 
from which life comes. This life comes from faith and faith gives birth 
to all virtue and the knowledge of Christ."29 Like the cross, all Chris-
tian truth within this view is understood as messianic, as ongoing 
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revelation that, in not being ahistorical, is subject to change. As such, 
this sort of truth may at any time throw interpretive tradition, con-
ventional wisdom and, inevitably, social relations into crisis. 
Further, this truth comes not by way of ruthless examination, but 
as a patiently awaited gift from God.3D Sixteenth-century Anabaptists 
focused their attention not on the question of right belief or ortho-
doxy, but rather on right relationship or obedience to messianic truth. 
To quote Marpeck again: "The spiritual in Christ are committed to 
obedience to the Father in patience and love through the Word even 
as Christ, the Righteous one, became obedient unto death."31 Again, 
the problem is not truth, its status, or its acquisition, but instead one's 
relationship to God's gift of messianic truth. For the Anabaptist par-
r~esia~tes the practice of truth telling involves not only a certain rela-
tIonshlp to the powers to which one speaks truth out of duty, but also 
a certain relationship to an unruly truth received as a gift from the 
One who gives all. 
So far we have argued that we should read Weaver's a-theology 
as parrhesia. Further, we have argued that doing so is important be-
cause it enables us to see that his arguments are not merely irritating. 
~~ther, the manner in which they are made, their rhetoric, similar as 
It IS to the practice of parrhesia among ancient Greeks, is a form of 
not-modern truth telling. Weaver's practice of truth telling is impor-
tant for us in these postmodern days because, as we argued earlier, it 
shows a way to get around the modern problem of truth through 
ethics. The truth teller tells the truth not by way of a certain method-
ologism but via a certain moral ethos. Thus, noticing how Weaver 
and other Anabaptists tell the truth in this way can put us on the track 
of how we might also speak truth to power in our postmodern con-
text. 
Along the way we noted two distinctives of Anabaptist truth 
telling: first, that the truth Anabaptists tell is always received as an 
unruly truth in the sense that it is a truth on the move; and second, 
that it comes as a gift from God.32 Thus, Anabaptist truth telling is not 
~he same as the truth telling that Foucault describes. Because we are 
1~1terested in enabling truth telling in our postmodern times in a dis-
tInctly Anabaptist manner, we want to advocate an Anabaptist ethos 
of truth telling that presumes that the truth told is received as an un-
ruly gift of God. In preparation for that argument we want first to say 
something about our relationship to God's gifts and about rhetoric. 
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STEWARDSHIP 
Like good stewards of the manifold grace of God, serve one another with 
whatever gift each of you has received. Whoever speaks must ~o so as one 
speaking the venj words of God; whoever serves must do so with ~he 
strength that God supplies, so that God may be glorified in all thtngs 
through Jesus Christ. To him belong the glory and the power forever and 
ever. Amen.33 
- Peter of Jerusalem (1 Pet. 4:10-11) 
Thinking about God's gifts and our relationship to them is an an-
cient preoccupation at least as old as the Judeo-Christian story of the 
origins of creation. In the first account of creation, for instance, we 
read the following: "God said, 'See, I have given you every plant 
yielding seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree 
with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for food. And to every 
beast of the earth and to every bird of the air, and to everything that 
creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have 
given every green plant for food'" (Gen. 1:29-30). Thus God cre~tes 
all and gives all to human beings. But even as the whole creation IS a 
gift of God, God retains ownership of all. The Psalmist writes: "The 
earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof; the world, and they that 
dwell therein" (Ps. 24:1) . In the context of God's creation, gift, and 
ownership of all, human beings are positioned as stewards of the 
creation.34 
We learn something of what it means to be a steward in Genesis 
when man is placed within the context of that gift: "The Lord G?~ 
took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to fill it and keep It 
(Gen. 2:1.5). The r~sponsibility of human beings as stewards .is not to 
cr~at~ thmgs, but mstead,like gardeners, to cultivate God's gIftS from 
withm a posture of submission. Genesis' message is 
that the responsibility of every man is like the gardener'S, t? 
know that though he creates nothing he is responsible to culti-
vate what God has given; that growth cannot be forced by any 
human haste and that the silent process of the divine unfolding 
~ust be trusted; and that those who have grown most in grace, 
lIke m~n who must have their gardens grow in sun and rain and 
changmg seasons, will be most humble in themselves and most 
reverent before the unfolding mysteries of God.35 
The steward of God's gift who submits and cultivates displays an 
ethos called for by her relationship to the one who creates, gives, and 
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owns the creation. Since Anabaptists understand truth to be a gift of 
God, we suggest a particular practice of truth telling that presumes a 
posture of stewardship in relationship to truth. 
RHETORIC 
For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ 
crucified, a stumbLing bLock to Jews and fooLishness to Gentiles, but to 
those who are the caLLed, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God 
and the wisdom of God. For God's fooLishness is wiser than human wis-
dom, and God's weakness is stronger than In/man strength. 
-Paul of Tarsus (I Cor. 1: 22-25) 
As Foucault acknowledges throughout FearLess Speech, truth 
telling is rhetorical. "Parrhesia," according to Foucault, "is thus a sort 
?f 'fi.gure' among rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic: that it 
IS wlthout any figure since it is completely natural. Parrhesia is the 
zero degree of those rhetorical figures which intensify the emotions of 
the aUdience."36 As a mode of speaking that disavows its rhetoricity, 
?arr~esia is especially rhetoricaP7 But to say that parrhesia is rhetor-
lCalls only a start because, as Foucault points out, there are multiple 
rhetorics or multiple ways of thinking about the relationship between 
truth telling and rhetoric. 
Considering the two predominant views on rhetoric and truth 
from the ancient Greek context, for instance, we see that truth telling, 
~ollowing Plato, may be understood as the opposite of rhetoric-that 
IS as speech that is transparent to truth rather than veiled in elo-
quence. Or truth telling, following Aristotle, may be understood as 
ma~e possible by rhetoric when two opposing viewpoints are set 
agamst one another in debate so that the audience, given its propen-
si.ty to appreciate when a position has been demonstrated, can recog-
l1lze the position that is true. But rather than adopt either of these 
philosophical perspectives on rhetoric that understands truth to be, 
by definition, static, we take up a sophistic view of rhetoric since, ~s 
we shall see, its view of rhetoric in relationship to an unruly truth IS 
well suited to Anabaptist parrhesia. 
For the Sophists, who were itinerant teachers of rhetoric through-
out the Greek city-states in the fifth-century BCE, truth understood in 
absolute terms is at best elusive. According to Protagoras, a leading 
Sophist, knowledge about ultimate things like the gods is unavailable 
to human beings: "Concerning the gods," Protagoras argues, "I can-
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not know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what form 
'kn ing' the ob-they might have, for there is much to prevent one s ow . 
scurity of the subjec~ and the sh?rtness of ~an'~ life:"38 Similarly, ~~~ 
gias, another promment SOphIst of the hme, IS saId to have arg 
that nothing exists but that even if anything exists it is inc~~~rehen­
sible and, further, that even if anything is comprehensible, It IS mcom-
municable.39 What human beings do have access to are the human 
truths (or doxa) that emerge relative to their own experience and 
which, therefore, vary from place to place and time to time. Thus, Pro-
tagoras writes that "Of all things the measure is man, of things that 
t "40 are that they are, and of things that are not that they are no . 
For the Sophists, then, truth is elusive on two registers: first, at the 
level of an absolute, Truth is elusive since even if it exists, human be-
ings have no access to it; and second, at th~ level of human experience, 
truth is elusive since it changes over time and space. Insof~r as So-
phistic truth is not static like philosophical truth but, instead, macces-
sible and ever changing, we may say that it is also unruly.41 
Not only did the Sophists understand truth to be unruly. More 
importantly for our purposes they thought that it was the job of rhet-
oric to encourage its unruliness. In a fragment attributed to Prota?~­
r~s, ~or ~stance, he articulates the sophistic principle that rhetonc ~ 
alffi IS to mak[e] the weaker argument the stronger."42 Since Protago 
ras does not believe that human beings have access to truth, we 
~hould not take him to mean by "the stronger argument" the one that 
IS truer when measured against some external truth standard. I~­
stead, we must take him to mean the argument that most closely reIt-
erates accepted human truth. To say that the aim of rhetoric is to ma~e 
the weaker argument the stronger, then, is to say that rhetoric'S task IS 
not only to challenge but to transform the dominant truths of a cul-
ture by articulating an alternative one.43 
To t~ansform truth requires, according to the Sophists, attentive-
ness to tlffie and occasion. Since truth is bound by time and context, 
any effort to transform it must be likewise constrained. Thus, John 
Poulakos, scholar of sophistic rhetoric, argues that "The Sophists 
stres~ed t~at ~peech must show respect to the temporal dimension of 
the SItuatIOn It addresses, that is, it must be timely. In other words, 
speech must take into account and be guided by the temporality ~f 
the situation in which it occurs. "44 As kairotic discourse, rhetoric IS 
obliged to speak into the particularities of the moment and, espe-
cially, the urgencies at hand. Indeed, as Poulakos argues, "what com-
pels a rhetor to speak is a sense of urgency" and further, "to intervene 
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and, with the power of the word, to attempt to end a crisis, redistrib-
ute justice, or restore order,"4s 
Crucial here, however, is that any attempt to transform truth can 
only be successful if it is spoken in the moment that calls it into being: 
"ideas have their place in time and unless they are given existence, 
unless they are voiced at the precise moment they are called upon, 
they miss their chance to satisfy situationally shared voids within a 
particular audience."46 
By implication, then, when the particularities of the moment do 
not call forth a rhetorical response, silence should be the order of the 
~ay.47 An important implication of the kairotic dimension of rhetoric 
1~ tha~ anyone who dares to speak into the moment does so at some 
nsk ~mce "his timing might not coincide with the temporal needs of 
th~ sltuation."48 The rhetorician may mistake the moment and, in so 
domg, speak a discourse at the wrong time and, therefore, fail to 
move the audience to an alternative truth. 
In a similar manner, the Sophists recognized that rhetoricians 
must be attentive to the formal demands of the occasion in which they 
sp~ak. Audiences have expectations about the kind of rhetoric that 
~UltS, say, a funeral versus a wedding versuS a typical Sunday morn-
mg worship service. According to the Sophists, for any rhetoric to be 
successful in transforming accepted truth, it has to respond appropri-
ately to the character of the occasion and the expectations of the audi-
ence.49 As with kairos, pl'epon (or appropriateness to occasion) also in-
volves risk: "If what is spoken is the result of a misreading on ~1e part 
?f ~e rhetor, it subsequently becomes obvious to us: even ~o hIm, that 
thIS was not the right thing to say. "'SO Likewise, "If sde~ce IS called f~r 
and the response is speech, we have a rhetor misspeakmg to an audI-
ence not ready to listen, or not ready to listen to what he has to say, or 
ready to listen but not to the things he is saying."s1 Taken together, 
then: kairos and prepon characterize rhetoric as discourse. that says 
the .nght thing at the right time to transform accepted truth mto alter-
natlve truth. 
. With all of this emphasis on the moment and the occasion, we 
mlght think that sophistic rhetoric is all about the present and what 
already exists. But this is not so. As we have already said, a key char-
acteristic of sophistic rhetoric is its aim to make the weaker argument 
the stronger, to displace dominant truths with alternative ones, to 
transform the actual into the possible. Beginning in the here and now 
an~ attentive to kairos and prepon, the rhetorician nevertheless "tries 
to hft [the audience] from the vicissitudes of custom and habit and 
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. . d new conse-take them into a new place where new discovenes an 
quences can be made."52 . b 
In this way, sophistic rhetoric, whose only foundatIon can e 
found in the exigencies of the moment and the expectations of the.~r 
dience, seeks to transport its audience to the realm of the POSSl .e 
wherein the limits of current time and space are transgressed by aspI-
ration and hope. . h 
In this sophistic theory of rhetoric we hear deep resonances WI~ 
Anabaptism. Like Anabaptism, sophistic rhetoric understands tru 
to be unruly and disruptive of the status quo. Moreover, like Anaba?-
tism sophistic rhetoric takes as its aim the encouragement of suc~ diS-
ruption through public discourse. Given these resonances, w~ bnng a 
sophistic (rather than philosophical) view of rhetoric to thIS prole-
gomenon for a stewardship rhetoric. Thus, in what folloWS we apply 
the sophistic ideas of kairos and prepon to the question of what 
should characterize Anabaptist parrhesia. 
A RHETORIC OF STEWARDSHIP 
He became angry, and said that what I advanced was only sophistry. : .. 
Thereupon I said that Paul writes that we should not be shaken in nund, 
neither by spirit nor by word, nor by letter, as sent from them; or ev~ 
though an angel from heaven should come, and teach us anything different 
from what is written in the holy Gospel, he should be accursed. 53 
-Martyrs Mirror 
If one sought to identify the ethos of Anabaptism with a single 
concept, that concept would surely be Gelassenheit. From sixtee~th­
century Ar:abaptist martyrs to present-day Old Order Am.Ish, 
Gelassenhelt characterizes a genuine Anabaptist posture in relation-
ship to God.54 Robert Friedmann argued that Gelassenheit beca~e 
central to Anabaptist identity because it defined so well Anabaptist 
faith in the context of persecution: "their own teaching of obedience 
and discipleship almost required this attitude as the precondition of a 
reborn soul to walk the narrow path. The idea of martyrdom becomes 
bearable only on such a basis of self-surrender and joyous acceptance 
of God's will. Only through Gelassenheit may suffering become the 
royal road to God."55 Almost 1,500 years later, in a context largely d~­
void of persecution, Old Order Amish identity features Geiassenhelt 
as well. Donald Kraybill argues that Gelassenheit provides the key to 
unlocking all the riddles of Amish culture: 
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The solution to the riddle of Amish culture is embedded in the 
German word Gelassenheit. Roughly translated, Gelassenheit 
means 'submitting, yielding to a higher authority.' Rarely used 
in speech, it is an abstract concept that carries a variety of spe-
~ific meanings-self-surrender, resignation to God's will, yield-
Ing to God and to others, self-denial, contentment, a calm 
spirit."56 
Yielding as Submission 
At the heart of the various translations given for Gelassenheit is 
the notion of yielding to God, to other, to community. Yielding is often 
pa~red. with submission to get more fully at the meaning of Gelassen-
~eIt. Yieidedness as submission is a deeply biblical idea and one that 
IS closely tied to how we are to receive God's gifts-or, put another 
way, how we are to be stewards of God's gifts. Indeed, throughout the 
~ld and New Testaments we learn that people who receive God's 
gIfts are called to submission. This is so whether the gift received is 
the whole creation (Adam and Eve), great expanses of land and many 
descendants (Abraham), the deliverance of his people (Moses), the in-
fant Messiah (Mary), or revelation (Paul). 
In each case God calls the receiver of the gift to submit her life to 
G.od's will in ways that are profoundly disruptive to her, her commu-
mty, and even the social order. In the case of Mary, for instance, at the 
~nnunciation she willingly submits all of her life to God upon hear-
ll1g that she has found favor with God and will give birth to the Mes-
siah: "Here am I, the servant of the Lord; let it be with me according to 
your w?rd" (Luke 1:38). In her response to God's gift, ~ar~ gives her-
self e~h~ely to God's purpose setting no limits or quahflC~h?nS on her 
submIssIOn to God's word. Of course, since she was a vlrgll1 and en-
g.aged to Joseph, her submission to God's plan compromised her so-
CIal position and, indeed, her whole life. 
. ~ the same way, Paul responds to the gift of God's truth by sub-
mlttll1g his whole life so that he loses all his possessions and the value 
system within which he treasured them. More importantly, he sub-
mi~s to a whole new understanding of salvation according to which 
he IS required to abandon his once ardently held conviction that right-
eousness comes from obedience to the law and, instead, to develop 
faith in the claim that salvation comes through following Jesus all the 
way to the cross. Thus, Paul writes in Ephesians, "[flor his sake I have 
suffered the loss of all things, and I regard them as rubbish, in order 
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that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteous-
ness of my own that comes from the law, but one that comes through 
faith in Christ, the righteousness from God based on faith" ~3:8.-9). . 
Paul's submission is important for stewardship rhetorIc smce In 
his example we see how we are to respond to God's gift of truth and, 
in particular, to the truth of the cross. For Anabaptists, as we have 
noted more than once, the truth of the cross is the most important 
truth. But that truth is not simply the conventional one-that by 
Jesus' blood we are saved. Rather, as John Howard Yoder has taught 
us, the cross (and with it always the resurrection) represents t~e 
breaking of the sovereignty of the Powers who enslave uS to theu 
truths and by their claim to be all powerfu1.57 
At the cross we are invited to see that the power claimed by the 
Powers is a ruse and, thus, that the Powers are false gods. Once we see 
that this is so and willingly submit (as Jesus did) to the truth that God 
is sovereign even over the Powers, that the whole creation has already 
been reconciled to God (in actuality, even if not apparently), then. ~e 
are not only freed from the enslavement of the powers but free to Jom 
in the reconciling work of the new creation that is the church.58 Wit.h 
this truth as our gift, then, the submission to which we are called IS 
obedience to a radically unruly truth that always promises to rela-
tivize all that we know, believe, and value. 
As receivers of a gift such as this, a gift of truth that is radical and 
unruly, what should be our posture as its stewards? If we take Paul as 
our example, then we may say first of all that we are called to submit 
all that we have and are to it. Like Paul we must be willing to give over 
to this truth not only all of our possessions and the values by which 
,:e treasure them but also, and more importantly, our deepest conv~c­
hons. If we are to take as our task the dissemination of this truth as Its 
rhet~r~ci~s, then we must be willing to subject all that we know to its 
relahvlzmg power. The ethos of a stewardship rhetorician must be as 
one who is always available to God's new truth truth we cannot yet 
imagine but that is on the way. Indeed, we must'be relentlessly atten-
tive to God's inbreaking revelation in our contemporary context no 
matter how disruptive it may be of what has become obviously true 
for us. If this is so, then our stewardship rhetoric must likewise be 
available to the radically transformative force of God's next revela-
tion. It cannot become too fixed or static. It must remain contingent on 
what new word God is trying to give us. 
But even as we submit to God's ongoing and unruly revelation 
we are also called to submit to the truth we already know, the truth of 
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the cross-namely, that victory over death and the Powers has al-
~ead y been won, the reign of God is among us, and, therefore, our task 
IS not to force history to come out right.59 Rather, our task is to follow 
Jesus by freely giving away the good news of that victory all the way 
to the cross. If we submit to this truth as we submit to God's ongoing 
revelation, then even as we energetically disseminate God's truth, we 
cannot as stewardship rhetoricians force it on the other. In the end, we 
are called as stewards of the truth that is Jesus Christ to yield to the 
other's unbelief, even to the other's rebellion against God's truth. 
Yielding as Cultivation 
The constellation of terms used to capture the meaning of 
Gelas~enheit includes yielding as well as resignation, self-surrender, 
obedIence, contentment, and calm spirit. Taken together these terms 
may suggest a posture that is passive not only in relationship to God 
but to the whole world as well. Interestingly, however, the notion of 
yielding entails not only submission but also cultivation in the sense 
that ~ field yields a crop or a well placed financial investment ~ields a 
p~ofIt. ~ultivation denotes careful tending toward the productlOn of a 
YIeld. YIelding as cultivation is most surely not passive as it often in-
volves both planning and ongoing care. . . 
Perhaps the biblical text that most strongly speaks of a YIeld culh-
vated out of God's truth is the great commission, wherein Jesus' fol-
low~rs ~:e commanded by him to cultivate disciples ~to the bo~~ of 
Chnst: Go therefore and make disciples of all natlOns, baptlzmg 
them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, 
and teaching them to obey everything that I have command,;d you. 
And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age (Matt. 
28:19-.20) . Thus we are called not only to receive God's tr~th and to 
subr~ut Our whole lives to it but, having done so, to help It grow by 
mak~g, baptizing, and teaching disciples with this truth. Rather than 
enter mto the complexities of missiological debate here about how 
best to answer that commandment, we do well to remember Yoder's 
argument that before perfecting our missiology, we are first called to 
announce and to celebrate the reign of God.6o 
~o cultivate God's gift of truth, a stewardship rhetoric mus.t first 
ta~e 111tO account the fact that, though victoriou~, th~t truth IS not 
WIdely recognized. Indeed, the Powers do not belIeve m the truth of 
~he cross and largely live and work in rebellion against it. In address-
mg th~se who do not yet acknowledge the reign of God, stewa~dship 
rhetonc must be mindful that its task is, as it was for the SophIsts, to 
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make the weaker argument the stronger. This posture of ~~eaking 
from the underside of conventional wisdom should be famihar fro~ 
Jesus' teachings and, of course, his work on the cross. As stewards~lp 
rhetoricians, then, our aim is to disrupt the stronger argument WIth 
the weaker argument of the truth of the cross. 
To succeed in making the weaker argument of the cross appear 
th d h · h . . b' the Sophists did stronger, e stewar s Ip r etoncian must egm a~ . . d W 
in a certain moment and place with a particular audIence m mm . d.e 
must begin amid all of the pre-existing beliefs and values of our au 1-
ence as well as the various constraints and realities of the present mO-
ment. But although our stewardship rhetoric must begin there, it can-
not remain there, since to do so would be merely to reproduce ~e ~ta­
tus quo. Instead, in recognition of the timely (kairos) and the fIttmg 
(prepon), but with attention focused on the gap between those who ac-
knowledge the reign of God and those who yet do not, the steward-
ship rhetorician is called to craft appeals capable of articulating the 
audience into the reign of God. 
To craft a stewardship rhetoric able to move an audience from 
obedience to the stronger argument which will always be the arg~-
, h' hIS 
ment of the Powers, to obedience to the weaker argument, w IC . 
the reign of God, takes the utmost in rhetorical sensitivity and skill. 
The stewardship rhetorician will like the Sophist need to be some-
one who is keenly perceptive of the present that sh~ and her audience 
occupy and who can fashion out of a common language neW argu-
ments and appeals on behalf of radical transformation. 
These days we hear important calls for a certain kind of exchange 
wi~ the other in which we may make our arguments to the best of our 
abllity so long as we also make ourselves available to the transform-
~g power of the other's argument.61 This is mutually transformative 
dIalogue, we are told, and it is ethical insofar as both interlocutors are 
ultimately willing to submit to the otherness of the other's argumen~. 
To take up this posture is tempting because it seems to solve the ethI-
cal problem of advocacy. I can freely advocate my position without 
having to worry ~hat I am somehow oppressing the other so long .as I 
make myse~f available to the arguments of the other. But is it pOSSIble 
or even desuable for me to assume that posture of availability to the 
other's argument? 
First, as. to its ~ossibility, how would I go about choosing to m~ke 
myself avaIlable ill that way? By what psychological mechamsm 
could I excise or bracket from my mind my deeply held convictio~s 
such that I could hear the arguments of the other? Indeed, is my avall-
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ability to the other a question of choice? Is it possible for me to decide 
that I will make myself available to radical transformation or, instead, 
is radical transformation something that happens despite my own 
volition? Second, as to its desirability, if my deeply held convictions 
are faithful to the truth that is the cross, do I even want to make them 
available to such radical transformation? We believe that it is neither 
probable that faithful Christians can nor desirable that they should 
bracket the truth of the cross. 
Rather than try to make ourselves available to the arguments of 
the other to solve the ethical problem of persuasion, the stewardship 
rhetorician is obliged by the call to cultivation of God's gift of truth to 
make her arguments as persuasively as she can in the context of the 
moment and the situation. As she does so, she necessarily takes the 
risks that she may have misunderstood the moment or the occasion 
and, thus, misspeaks. She must risk the possibility that she may speak 
when she should not, or that she may say the wrong thing. In addition 
to ta~ing these risks, we propose that she take another-that is, that 
she nsk the possibility that she will speak wrongly to the other, per-
haps even to the point of oppressing the other. The stewardship 
rhetorician must recognize that this is a possibility-that her speech 
may coerce and that she may engage in moral error. Further, if she 
does, then she must own that ethical failure. 
To reduce the chances that she will make such an error, the stew-
ardship rhetorician must consider carefully to whom, when, and 
wher~ she speaks. Having a true word to say is not ~ufficient for 
spea~mg it. The stewardship rhetorician will have to weIgh whether a 
certam audience is in a moment and place in which it can hear that 
word. If not, then the stewardship rhetorician should choose to re-
main silent and make the case another day. Importantly, then, the 
choice of the stewardship rhetorician is not about adapting the. truth 
to her audience to make it easier to take. Neither, however, IS her 
choice about making certain that in speaking the truth, she guaran-
~ees that the audience knows she is willing to subject that truth to rad-
Ical revision by the audience. Instead, it is about discerning the mo-
ment and knowing when to speak and when to rema~ silent. 
. Of COurse, the stewardship rhetorician must receIve an~ ta~e se-
n~u~ly the arguments of the other. Again, however, the pomt m re-
Celvmg them is not to make the truth of the cross available to radical 
transformation by the other's argument. Instead the point is to listen 
to t~e argument of the other through the truth of the cross. If upon lis-
tenmg carefully to it, the stewardship rhetorician decides that the ar-
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gument of the other is in rebellion against the truth of the cross, thedn 
dd 't' the stewar -she is called to dissuade the other from it. In a 1 lOn, 
ship rhetorician should listen for the ways in which the truth of thhe 
. B l' tening for t e cross may be troublmg the other's argument. y IS 
gaps or fissures within an argument and between one and ano:e~ 
argument, the stewardship rhetorician seeks to yield a new tru 0 
the cross. d' 
With these last two points made about the cultivation of Go 5 
gift of truth on the part of the stewardship rhetorician, we need to re-
call three crucial points previously made. This is so since these t~o 
points about cultivation may seem to say that the stewards~lp 
rhetorician is the lone advocate for a truth about which she is certa~. 
This is not the case. First, if we remember that the stewardshIp 
rhetorician only gains access to truth in the context of the bod~ ~f 
Christ gathered around Scripture in the presence of the Holy Spmt, 
then we know that she is not alone. On the contrary, she is account-
able to that community for the truth she tells. Second, if we remember 
that she (in th~ context of that community) always avails the truth she 
knows to radIcal revision by God, then we know that she ho!ds ~: 
truth of the cross humbly in relationship to the one who gIveS I . 
Third, if we remember that she speaks truth always as the ~eake.r ar-
gumen~ to the. stronger, which is to say from below in a relationshIp of 
power m SOCiety and history, then her unwillingness to make the 
truth of the cross available to the radical transformation of the o~er 
can be seen as ~ot an instance of domination by persuasion but, m-
stead, as a practIce of Witness. 
CONCLUSION 
Christ's servants follow him to death and give their body, life, and breath 
on cross and rack and pyre As gold ' t . d d ifi' d they stand the 
,( (: 62 . lS rze an purz e test 0) ) lre. 
-Ausbund Hymn 
Robert Friedm~ lamented that as Mennonites have become ac-
cult.urated to a SOCIety that puts a premium on individualism ~nd 
achleveme~t they have largely abandoned Gelassenheit.63 Seemg 
Gelassenhelt as too passive for engagement with the world, Mennon-
ites who h~ve left behind What are often understood as the backward 
and sectanan ways of the Old Orders reject yielding. But if we take 
into account the two senses of yielding we have been developing 
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here-that is, both submission to God and others and cultivation of 
~he reign of God through persuasive speech-then even we Mennon-
Ites who want most to engage the world may imagine a posture or 
ethos that embodies our sixteenth-century ancestors' identity in 
Gelassenheit, but in a way that is neither passive nor sectarian. 
That posture, of course, is the ethos of the stewardship rhetori-
cian, characterized by submission to God and an unwillingness to co-
er~e the other. Adopting this posture is an act of faith and disciple-
ShIp because it only makes sense to one who knows that the sover-
eignty of the Powers has been broken. But the ethos of the steward-
ship rhetorician is also, like Weaver's and the sixteenth-century Ana-
baptists, that of the parrhesiastes who speaks truth to power out of 
duty and in the context of risk to cultivate the reign of God within the 
church and beyond. 
As we bring this essay to a close, we are reminded of the words of 
a seventeenth-century stewardship rhetorician, Thieleman van 
Braght, who endeavored to remind the acculturated Mennonites of 
his t.ime. of the need for a reinvigorated faith based in submission and 
cultIvatlOn. In the opening paragraph of the preface to The Bloody The-
ater or Martyrs Mirror, he warns his brothers and sisters in the faith 
tha.t the story he has to tell is not pleasant, perhaps even irritating. He 
WrItes: 
But most beloved, do not expect that we shall bring you into Gre-
Clan theatres, to gaze on merry comedies or gay performances. 
Here shall not be opened unto you the pleasant arbors and pleas-
ure gardens of Atlas, Adonis or Semiramis .... True enough, we 
shall lead you into dark valleys, even into the valleys of.death, 
Where nothing will be seen but dry bones, skulls, and fnghtful 
skeletons of those who have been slain; these beheaded, those 
drowned, others strangled at the stake, some burnt, others bro-
ken on the wheel, many torn by wild beasts, half devoured: and 
put to death in manifold cruel ways; besides, a great multitude 
who having escaped death bear the marks of Jesus, their Savior, 
on their bodies, wandering about over mountains and valleys, 
through forests and wilderness, forsake of friends and kindred, 
~obbed and stripped of all their temporal possessions, and living 
111 extreme poverty.64 
To be sure, stewardship rhetoric is not for the faint of heart. It is no 
easier to speak than it is to hear and least of all to embody as an ongo-
ing practice. But a cloud of witnesses has gone before us, whether 
Jesus, the martyrs, or J. Denny Weaver, to show us not only the way, 
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but that this way is the only way. As sisters and brothers in the body of 
Christ we are called both to submission and to cultivation because, as 
, . 1 "the the third-century church father Tertullian put it so conCIse y, 
blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church." 
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